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Introduction
In this poster I discuss the experiments of Libet and colleagues on conscious decisions, but my conclusions are also valid for other experiments inspired in 
it. The discussion concentrates on the concept of freedom which is presupposed in the experiment, and especially by those who interpret its results as a 
denial of the existence of human free will. I aim to show how a philosophical approach is also needed in the designs and interpretation of experimental 
data when important non-empirical human features are at stake.
I am indebted to the Institute for Culture and Society (ICS) of the University of Navarra (Spain) for funding this study, which is part of the interdisciplinary project ‘Mind-brain: biology and subjectivity in contemporary philosophy and Neuroscience’). More information about the project and the 
Institute can be found at http://www.unav.es/centro/cultura-y-sociedad/mente-cerebro 
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“Libet et al. asked their subjects to fixate a spot rotating every 2560 ms 
on a screen. Subjects made a voluntary movement of the right hand 
whenever they ‘felt the urge’ to do so. A random time later, the rotating 
spot stopped, and subjects indicated where the spot had been when 
they first felt the urge to move, the time of ‘conscious will’. The average 
time of this ‘W judgement’, as Libet called it, was 206 ms before the 
onset of muscle activity (Figure I). Libet also measured the preparatory 
brain activity preceding voluntary action, or readiness potential (RP), in 
the same trials. RP onset preceded W judgement by several hundred 
milliseconds. This suggests that the initiation of action involves an 
unconscious neural process, which eventually produces the conscious 
experience of intention. Conscious intentions therefore occur as a result 
of brain activity, and do not cause brain activity” (1).
As an example of this compatibility between the conscious execution of an urge and the determination by natural states, Aquinas was willing to accept 
the possibility that astrologers can foresee some human events based on the inspection of natural causes only in the case of people who do not order 
their desires according to reason:
“That astrologers not infrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number 
of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly 
bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in 
many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude” (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 95, a. 5, ad 2).
If we substitute the influence of heavenly bodies by the unconscious precedents of our activity, we can see that the classical view of freedom is 
compatible with the determination by brain processes of those conscious actions which do not imply a real orientation to the realization of true good. 
This can also make possible some kind of prediction based on patterns of brain activity, as suggested by some recent experiments (7). 
An alternative to this concept of freedom is the classical view, as proposed, for example, by some aristotelian philosophers. A good summary of some of its essential tenets is the following 
description, rooted in common sense, proposed by Thomas Fuchs, a german psychiatrist largely inspired in Aristotle and phenomenology:
“Free actions are characterized by (a) being explainable by their reasons or motives, (b) experiencing oneself as the author of the action, and (c) one’s 
capability to ‘act differently’ under equal external circumstances” (4).
It seems that freedom is envisaged in these 
experiments, and especially in their interpretations, 
only as the causality of mental conscious states. This 
explains why the model for a free action is 
‘consciously following a spontaneous urge’.
Conclusions
The conception of free action present in the experimental paradigm of Libet is too narrow. It would be better 
to call the conscious following of an urge ‘spontaneous action’. The decision to participate in the 
experiments is a better example of free action. Only within this rational framework the isolated movements of 
the participants considered by Libet can be properly named a human action.
This view displays the problem under a very different light, according to which the experimental paradigms 
aimed to study brain activity correlated to human action should be refined.
This is an example of the relevance of taking into account philosophical considerations in order to rightly 
define the concepts involved in brain research, especially those which are not directly empirical.
Libet himself does not interpret his finding as a proof that free choice is an illusion. Developing a proposal of Roger Sperry, he proposed that the emergent conscious experience is represented in a field, the conscious 
mental field (CMF). The CMF would unify the experience generated by the many neural units. It would also be able to affect certain neural activities and form a basis for conscious will. This allows, for example, the possibility of 
vetoing the unconscious brain processes. The conscious mental field would be a new ‘natural’ field. It would be a nonphysical field, in the sense that it could not be directly observed or measured by any external physical means. 
That attribute is, of course, the well-known feature of conscious subjective experience, which is only accessible to the individual having that experience (5).
Some authors point out that the results of these experiments are a proof that free choice is an illusion. 
However, in order to discuss these experiments, and especially its interpretations there are some previous question to ask
Being explainable by their reasons or motives
Free activity presupposes the possibility to judge the convenience 
of an action in a rational way.
This implies to accept the distinction between an instinctive urge or 
desire and a rational desire. The name for the capacity of 
originating the latter is called free will.
The distinction between sensitive and rational desires 
presupposes the distinction between sensibility (which also 
includes imagination), which does not make an explicit 
discrimination between reality and appearances, and the 
intellectual and rational knowledge, which entails the capacity 
to know reality in itself, and is explicitly concerned with 
truth. Intellectual knowledge is responsible for scientific activity.
Free action are explainable by reasons because they are directed 
to what we consider in some sense a real good.
Experiencing oneself as the author of the action
Free activity presupposes an agent which is responsible for the action.
Action is in itself an affirmation of the reality of the agent.
Free action not only exerts an influence in the external world, but also an 
influence in the agent. This is developed in classical ethics in the theory 
of habits and virtues. Virtue is not a habit in the sense of determined 
patterns of action, but a disposition to act in a rational way in a particular 
field, which can have diverse manifestations depending on the 
circumstances.
Human free actions are not only aimed to some particular good, but 
included in a conception of the global good of the agent. Aristotle calls 
this global good ‘happiness’ and the activity of choosing in this way 
proairesis.
Ethics depends on the fact that the experience of being author of one’s own 
life –of being the person I am and really responsible for my activity– is not 
an illusion.
One’s capability to ‘act differently’ under equal external 
circumstances
Freedom also presupposes a world not totally determined.
In this view freedom is not compatible with a world in which all events, 
included human actions, were totally explainable and predictable by 
natural non personal causes.
This does not imply the denial of the existence of a natural order, but only the 
affirmation that natural order is not composed by events connected in a 
deterministic way. As an example of this compatibility, the acceptance of 
actions determined by reason is compatible with the necessity of the law of 
gravity. In fact, natural laws are not causes, and the scientific description of 
natural processes does not exclude the influence on them of other causes not 
envisaged by a particular science.
Freedom and rationality are not supernatural entities. They are natural, 
although not accessible to empirical sciences. 
First question:
Which is the concept of free will presupposed in this debate?
Second question: 
What is freedom and what does exactly make an action free?
Taken from Haggard (2)
